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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1 
 
 Amici curiae listed in the Appendix are professors of federal 
jurisdiction who teach and write about the justiciability doctrines 
informed by Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement, especially the 
law governing standing to sue. Amici hold a diverse range of views 
concerning the appropriate contours of the Supreme Court’s standing 
jurisprudence. Moreover, amici take no position here on the merits of 
the constitutional challenge to the “individual mandate” created by 
section 1501 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(PPACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501, 124 Stat. 119, 242–49 (2010). 
Instead, amici come together in this case to offer our views on two 
points with respect to which we have common cause: First, the 
Commonwealth of Virginia does not have standing to pursue the instant 
suit. Second, the district court’s reasoning to the contrary, see Virginia 
ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598 (E.D. Va. 2010), 
                                                 
1. Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29(a), the parties have consented to 
the filing of this brief. No counsel for a party authored this brief in 
whole or in part, and no counsel for a party (nor a party itself) made a 
monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission 
of this brief. No person other than amici or their counsel made a 
monetary contribution to its preparation or submission. 
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cannot be reconciled with extant jurisprudence, and would likely wreak 
substantial havoc on standing doctrine — if not on the appropriate role 
of the federal courts more generally. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 
It is a settled proposition that states do not have standing to sue 
the federal government as parens patriae of their citizens. See, e.g., 
Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660, 665 (1976) (per curiam). This 
rule results from the logical and legal reality that, where federal rights 
are concerned, “it is the United States, and not the state, which 
represents [citizens] as parens patriae.” Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 
U.S. 447, 486 (1923); see also Hodges v. Abraham, 300 F.3d 432, 444 
(4th Cir. 2002). 
The Mellon rule is not just an infrequently revisited footnote to 
the Court’s modern standing jurisprudence; rather, its ratio decidendi 
reflects a specific variation on a familiar (and fundamental) 
constitutional theme, i.e., that the Constitution’s structural guarantees 
exist to protect individuals, and not the sovereignty of the states as 
such. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 575–77 (1995) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). To that end, and as a long line of post-Mellon 
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cases reinforce, states suffer no freestanding injury simply because 
Congress has allegedly exceeded its Article I powers.  
Even as the Supreme Court has identified additional 
circumstances in which states might have a “quasi-sovereign” interest 
in suing private entities or other states on behalf of their citizens, it has 
never recognized a “quasi-sovereign” interest sufficient to justify suits 
challenging the constitutional scope of federal regulation. Instead, it 
has repeatedly reaffirmed the “critical difference between allowing a 
State ‘to protect her citizens from the operation of federal statutes’ 
(which is what Mellon prohibits) and allowing a State to assert its 
rights under federal law (which it has standing to do).” Massachusetts v. 
EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 n.17 (2007) (quoting Georgia v. Pa. R.R. Co., 
324 U.S. 439, 447 (1945)) (emphasis added). 
Nor is there anything to the argument that these settled 
precedents can be distinguished because of the conflict between the 
individual mandate and the Virginia Health Care Freedom Act, VA. 
CODE ANN. § 38.2-3430.1:1 (2010). To be sure, the Supreme Court has 
recognized a state’s sovereign (not “quasi-sovereign”) interest in “the 
exercise of sovereign power over individuals and entities within the 
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relevant jurisdiction,” which “involves the power to create and enforce a 
legal code, both civil and criminal.” Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. 
Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982). But this interest 
goes only to a state’s power to ensure that its (valid) laws are followed 
by those who are bound to comply. Manufacturing a conflict with 
federal law cannot of itself create an interest sufficient to support 
standing, since the state law creating the conflict will have no bearing 
whatsoever on the constitutional validity of the federal regulation. 
Because the district court rested Virginia’s standing on the mere 
existence of a conflict between federal and state law, and identified no 
freestanding injury to any other quasi-sovereign or proprietary interest, 
its holding allows for no principled distinction between this suit and any 
other in which a state would use preemption as the basis for standing, 
even where the state’s objection sounded purely in the applicability of a 
federal statute rather than its constitutionality.  
Instead, such a holding would provide an all-too-effective end-run 
around Mellon, since it would reduce the Supreme Court’s bar on parens 
patriae suits against the federal government to cases in which there is 
no state law with which the challenged federal action could be in 
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tension. In addition, to the extent that Mellon reflects deeper principles 
about Article III standing, including the bar on generalized grievances 
and the requirement that the plaintiff suffer a concrete, particularized 
injury, a rule that allows states to sue the federal government whenever 
there is a conflict between state and federal law would risk vitiating 
those requirements altogether in any instance in which a conflict is 
alleged to exist. Finally, and perhaps counterintuitively, allowing states 
to sue in virtually any instance of conflict with federal law would both 
interfere with the ability of individuals to vindicate their rights and 
short-circuit the principal means through which majorities have 
traditionally exercised control over the scope of federal power — at the 
ballot box.  
To affirm the district court’s conclusion that the Act suffices to 
confer standing upon Virginia would reward a state’s effort to nullify 
federal law, incentivize future such endeavors by any state that believes 
itself to be similarly aggrieved, and thereby involve the federal courts in 
an enterprise that Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement was 
specifically intended (and has long been interpreted) to keep them out 
of. As Professor Bickel warned, “It would make a mockery . . . of the 
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constitutional requirement of case or controversy . . . to countenance 
automatic litigation — and automatic it would surely become — by 
states situated no differently” than Virginia is here. Alexander M. 
Bickel, The Voting Rights Cases, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 79, 89–90.  
ARGUMENT 
 
I. THE RULE THAT STATES LACK STANDING TO SUE THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT AS PARENS PATRIAE REFLECTS FUNDAMENTAL 
PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
 
Just as members of Congress are not the appropriate parties to 
enforce the separation of powers, see, e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 
(1997), so too the states are not the appropriate party to challenge the 
constitutional scope of federal regulation, see, e.g., Mellon, 262 U.S. 447. 
This is so “not because the interests asserted are unreal or inadequately 
particular to the state, but because by hypothesis they should not, in 
such circumstances, suffice to invoke judicial action.” Bickel, supra, at 
88. Indeed,  
There would be nothing irrational about a system that 
granted standing in these cases; some European 
constitutional courts operate under one or another variant of 
such a regime. But it is obviously not the regime that has 
obtained under our Constitution to date. Our regime 
contemplates a more restricted role for Article III courts . . . . 
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Raines, 521 U.S. at 828 (citations omitted). Such a “more restricted” 
role “lies in the protection [judicial review] has afforded the 
constitutional rights and liberties of individual citizens and minority 
groups against oppressive or discriminatory government action.” United 
States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring). 
Critically, “[i]t is this role, not some amorphous general supervision of 
the operations of government, that has maintained public esteem for 
the federal courts and has permitted the peaceful coexistence of the 
countermajoritarian implications of judicial review and the democratic 
principles upon which our Federal Government in the final analysis 
rests.” Id.  
This conception of the role of the federal courts in turn depends 
upon litigation in which parties sue to protect their concrete, 
particularized interests. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 
739–40 (1972) (“[I]f any group with a bona fide ‘special interest’ could 
initiate such litigation, it is difficult to perceive why any individual 
citizen with the same bona fide special interest would not also be 
entitled to do so.”); see also United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 
555 (1979) (“Under our constitutional framework, federal courts do not 
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sit as councils of revision, empowered to rewrite legislation in accord 
with their own conceptions of prudent public policy.”). 
a. It is Settled Precedent that States May Not Sue the 
Federal Government to Vindicate the Rights of Their 
Citizens 
 
One manifestation of these background principles is the venerable 
rule that states may not sue the federal government merely to vindicate 
the individual rights of their citizens. See, e.g., Pennsylvania, 426 U.S. 
at 665 (“It has . . . become settled doctrine that a State has standing to 
sue only when its sovereign or quasi-sovereign interests are implicated 
and it is not merely litigating as a volunteer the personal claims of its 
citizens . . . .”). As Justice Sutherland explained for a unanimous Court 
in Mellon, 
It cannot be conceded that a state, as parens patriae, may 
institute judicial proceedings to protect citizens of the United 
States from the operation of the statutes thereof. While the 
state, under some circumstances, may sue in that capacity 
for the protection of its citizens, it is no part of its duty or 
power to enforce their rights in respect of their relations 
with the federal government. In that field it is the United 
States, and not the state, which represents them as parens 
patriae, when such representation becomes appropriate; and 
to the former, and not to the latter, they must look for such 
protective measures as flow from that status. 
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262 U.S. at 485–86 (citation omitted); see Texas v. ICC, 258 U.S. 158, 
162 (1922) (holding that Texas’s claim that Congress exceeded its 
enumerated powers “does not present a case or controversy within the 
range of the judicial power as defined by the Constitution”); see also 
Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12 (1927); New Jersey v. Sargent, 269 U.S. 
328 (1926).  
Thus, Massachusetts v. Mellon rejected Massachusetts’ standing 
to challenge the constitutionality of the Sheppard-Towner (or 
Maternity) Act of 1921, which provided matching federal funds for 
private programs designed “to reduce maternal and infant mortality,” 
262 U.S. at 478–79, on the ground that the Act interfered with state 
regulation in violation of the Tenth Amendment. See id. at 479. 
Similarly, in Texas v. ICC, Texas sought to challenge the 
constitutionality of key provisions of the Transportation Act of 1920, on 
the ground that they exceeded Congress’s powers to regulate interstate 
commerce, see 258 U.S. at 160. Again, the Court rejected the state’s 
standing to proceed absent a showing of a more concrete and direct 
injury to Texas’s sovereign interests. See id. at 162. 
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Comparable claims were made — and dismissed — in Florida v. 
Mellon and New Jersey v. Sargent. In the former case, Florida sought to 
enjoin the Secretary of the Treasury from collecting certain taxes 
imposed by section 301 of the Revenue Act of 1926, on the ground that 
the taxes exceeded Congress’s powers under Article I, Section 8. The 
Court rejected Florida’s standing, citing Massachusetts v. Mellon for the 
proposition that “there is no substance in the contention that the state 
has sustained, or is immediately in danger of sustaining, any direct 
injury as the result of the enforcement of the act in question.” 273 U.S. 
at 18. And Sargent, like Texas v. ICC before it, held that challenges to 
the scope of federal regulation under the Commerce Clause were not 
properly brought by states absent some showing that some unique state 
interest was implicated. See 269 U.S. at 337–39. 
The origins of the rule for which these cases stand can easily be 
found in nineteenth-century doctrine, in which “states could not (in 
federal court) ordinarily litigate against the federal government or other 
states conflicting claims to regulate, nor could they seek to enforce their 
own legislation or to vindicate their extrastatutory interests in 
protecting their citizenry.” Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, 
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State Standing, 81 VA. L. REV. 387, 393 (1995). And although 
Massachusetts v. Mellon itself arose in the context of the Supreme 
Court’s original jurisdiction, in which special considerations might enter 
into play, see Snapp, 458 U.S. at 603 n.12; see also id. at 610–12 
(Brennan, J., concurring), it is now well-settled that its constraints 
apply just as much to suits — such as this one — initially filed in the 
lower federal courts. See Woolhandler & Collins, supra, at 490–91; see 
also Snapp, 458 U.S. at 610 n.16; Hodges, 300 F.3d at 444. 
b. Fundamental Constitutional Principles Mandate that 
the Federal Government Acts as Parens Patriae Where 
Federal Law is Implicated 
 
As the Court emphasized in Massachusetts v. Mellon, the impetus 
behind the bar on state standing in these circumstances is the practical 
and legal reality that it is the federal government, and not the states, 
which acts as parens patriae where federal rights are concerned. See, 
e.g., Mellon, 262 U.S. at 485–86; accord. Georgia, 324 U.S. at 446.2 
Moreover, as Professors Woolhandler and Collins have explained, 
                                                 
2. Thus, there is no analogous bar on suits by the federal 
government to enforce federal law against the states, their officers, or 
private parties. 
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The Court’s acceptance of an individual’s ability to raise 
structural constitutional issues in contests with 
governments may be due at least in part to the 
nonrecognition of a sovereign’s right to litigate such 
questions. This preference for having individuals rather than 
government police even structural guaranties expresses that 
individuals are the intended beneficiaries of those 
guaranties. 
 
Woolhandler & Collins, supra, at 440 (footnote omitted). So understood, 
Massachusetts v. Mellon is not just an infrequently revisited footnote to 
the Court’s modern standing jurisprudence; rather, its ratio decidendi 
reflects a specific variation on a familiar (and fundamental) 
constitutional theme: 
The Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States 
for the benefit of the States or state governments as abstract 
political entities, or even for the benefit of the public officials 
governing the States. To the contrary, the Constitution 
divides authority between federal and state governments for 
the protection of individuals. State sovereignty is not just an 
end in itself: Rather, federalism secures to citizens the 
liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power. 
 
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also Lopez , 514 U.S. at 575–77 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
a. Mellon Confirms that States Do Not Suffer a 
Freestanding Injury Whenever Congress Exceeds its 
Article I Powers 
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Inasmuch as Mellon and its successors reflect the principle that 
individuals are the intended beneficiaries of the Constitution’s 
structural guarantees, they also stand for the related but distinct 
proposition that states do not suffer a freestanding legally cognizable 
injury whenever Congress exceeds its Article I powers.3 In Mellon itself, 
“the complaint of the plaintiff state is brought to the naked contention 
that Congress has usurped the reserved powers of the several states by 
the mere enactment of the statute.” 262 U.S. at 483; see id. (“[I]t is plain 
                                                 
3. Thus, in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), the 
Supreme Court upheld South Carolina’s standing to contest whether 
Congress had the power under the Fifteenth Amendment to impose 
“preclearance” requirements on particular jurisdictions for future 
changes to local and state election laws, but rejected its ability to 
challenge the Voting Rights Act on due process and bill of attainder 
grounds. As the Court explained, South Carolina could raise the 
Fifteenth Amendment claim entirely because the Fifteenth Amendment 
(unlike the other constitutional provisions invoked by South Carolina) 
directly and uniquely governed the federal government’s relationship 
with the states as such. See id. at 324; see also Woolhandler & Collins, 
supra, at 492 (“Presumably the state sought to litigate its own liberty 
interest in setting voter qualifications, as provided by specific provisions 
of the Constitution that expressly contemplate state power to set such 
qualifications.”); accord. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 119–25 (1970) 
(Black, J.) (explaining why the Constitution creates a concrete interest 
on the part of the states in the allocation of control over election 
procedures). And even on those hyper-narrow terms, South Carolina 
has still met with rather harsh criticism. See, e.g., Bickel, supra, at 88–
90. 
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that that question . . . is political, and not judicial in character, and 
therefore is not a matter which admits of the exercise of the judicial 
power.”). Nor did it matter to the Court that Massachusetts alleged that 
“the ulterior purpose of Congress thereby was to induce the states to 
yield a portion of their sovereign rights.” Id. at 482. So too, in Texas v. 
ICC, Florida v. Mellon, New Jersey v. Sargent, and a host of other, 
similar cases. In short, “For purposes of litigation with the United 
States (through the officers charged with execution of federal laws), a 
state should have no recognizable interest in ensuring the fidelity of 
Congress to constitutional restraints.” Bickel, supra, at 88.4  
Although it would be some decades after Massachusetts v. Mellon 
before the Court articulated the modern guideposts for Article III 
                                                 
4. States may well have an interest — and suffer a particularized 
and concrete injury — when Congress improperly compels them to 
legislate, as was true in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 
(striking down a federal law on Tenth Amendment commandeering 
grounds in a suit brought by a state plaintiff). But those cases only 
prove the point, for the injury there is suffered directly by the state, and 
is not a generalized injury to the state’s citizens that the state seeks to 
litigate on their behalf. Whether a criminal defendant may rely upon 
the Tenth Amendment, see, e.g., United States v. Bond, 581 F.3d 128 (3d 
Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 455 (2010) (No. 09-1227), it is settled 
the private plaintiffs may not. See, e.g., Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. Tenn. 
Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 143–44 (1939). 
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standing, Justice Sutherland’s analysis on this point might best be 
understood as going to the existence vel non of a sufficiently 
particularized injury in fact to satisfy the case-or-controversy 
requirement. Put another way, “[t]he Court’s refusal to allow states to 
litigate their Governing Interests also reinforced the constitutional 
requirement, grounded in the separation of powers, that federal courts 
hear only cases and controversies.” Woolhandler & Collins, supra, at 
440; see also Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 48 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., 
dissenting) (“The Supreme Court’s decisions about suits over 
“generalized grievances” are closely related to Massachusetts v. 
Mellon . . . .”).5 
c. Even as the Supreme Court’s Approach to State 
Standing Has Liberalized in Suits Against Private 
Parties and Other States, the Mellon Rule Has Remained 
Sacrosanct 
 
                                                 
5. Thus, even when then-Judge Scalia suggested in Maryland 
People’s Counsel v. FERC, 760 F.2d 318 (D.C. Cir. 1985), that Congress 
in some circumstances should be able to confer parens patriae standing 
upon the states in suits against the federal government, his self-
described “narrow” opinion emphasized the extent to which the 
separation of powers both (1) barred such suits without federal 
legislation; and (2) might in some instances bar such legislation, as 
well. See id. at 321–22. Needless to say, no federal statute authorizes 
Virginia’s suit in this case. 
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Finally, although the Court has since recognized broader 
circumstances in which states can act as parens patriae of their citizens 
in suits against private entities or other states, see, e.g., Georgia, 324 
U.S. at 447, it has consistently reaffirmed the bar on parens patriae 
suits against the federal government, see, e.g., id. at 446. Nowhere is 
this distinction more apparent than the Supreme Court’s 1982 decision 
in Snapp, which recognized Puerto Rico’s standing to sue Virginia apple 
growers on a claim that the defendants had violated federal law by 
refusing to honor a preference for U.S. workers over temporary foreign 
workers. See 458 U.S. 592. Treating Puerto Rico as a “state,” see id. at 
608 n.15, the 8-0 Court concluded that it had standing to proceed, even 
as it expressly distinguished suits against the federal government, see 
id. at 610 n.16 (“Here, . . . the Commonwealth is seeking to secure the 
federally created interests of its residents against private defendants.”).  
A similar distinction was central to the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Massachusetts v. EPA. Although the Court there recognized a state’s 
standing to challenge federal administrative action (or, more precisely, 
the lack thereof), Justice Stevens’s opinion emphasized the “critical 
difference between allowing a State ‘to protect her citizens from the 
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operation of federal statutes’ (which is what Mellon prohibits) and 
allowing a State to assert its rights under federal law (which it has 
standing to do).” 549 U.S. at 520 n.17 (quoting Georgia, 324 U.S. at 447) 
(emphasis added); see also id. (“Massachusetts does not here dispute 
that the Clean Air Act applies to its citizens; it rather seeks to assert its 
rights under the Act.”).6 Indeed, the linchpin of the Court’s standing 
analysis was that rising sea levels would directly injure Massachusetts’ 
proprietary interests as a coastal property owner. See id. at 522–23; see 
also RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 265 (6th ed. 2009). 
In short, even as the Supreme Court has greatly increased the 
ability of states to sue both other states and private parties to vindicate 
“quasi-sovereign interests,” and even as it has allowed suits against the 
federal government to vindicate states’ statutory interests created by 
Congress, it has held fast to the Mellon rule as a categorical bar on pure 
parens patriae suits against the federal government. States simply do 
                                                 
6. The Court’s analysis may also have reflected the view that 
Congress had specifically authorized Massachusetts’ suit. See 
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 514 n.16. 
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not have a sovereign interest sufficient to confer standing anytime the 
federal government is alleged to have exceeded its constitutional power. 
II. STATE LAW CANNOT CREATE STANDING MERELY BY PURPORTING 
TO EXEMPT STATE CITIZENS FROM FEDERAL LAW 
 
Conceding the continuing force of the Mellon bar, Virginia 
contends — and the district court held — that it nevertheless has a 
sufficient interest to support standing because of the conflict between 
the individual mandate and Virginia’s Health Care Freedom Act. The 
argument, in short, is that Virginia is not proceeding as parens patriae, 
but is rather seeking to vindicate its unique interest in enforcing the 
(otherwise preempted) state law. See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari Before Judgment at 7, Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 
No. 10-1014 (U.S. filed Feb. 8, 2011). As cases identifying valid 
sovereign and quasi-sovereign interests show, however, the distinction 
on which this argument rests is without a difference. 
a. Quasi-Sovereign Interests Only Include Protecting the 
Health and Well-Being of Citizens and Preventing 
Discriminatory Treatment Within the Federal System 
 
As noted above, the Supreme Court since Massachusetts v. Mellon 
has to some degree relaxed the constraints on the ability of states to sue 
in some circumstances. Further to that end, the Court has articulated 
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criteria pursuant to which states might have a “quasi-sovereign” 
interest sufficient to satisfy both Article III and prudential standing 
considerations, at least in suits against private parties or other states. 
See, e.g., Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907) (“In that 
capacity the State has an interest independent of and behind the titles 
of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain. It has the last 
word as to whether its mountains shall be stripped of their forests and 
its inhabitants shall breathe pure air.”).  
 Tellingly, though, in none of these cases did the Supreme Court 
ever suggest that a state could use such a “quasi-sovereign” interest to 
sue the federal government; quite to the contrary. See, e.g., Snapp, 458 
U.S. at 610 n.16. Nor has any case suggested that a state could create 
such a “quasi-sovereign” interest merely by exempting its citizens from 
compliance with applicable federal law, and for good reason. Absent 
circumstances such as those identified in cases like Georgia v. 
Pennsylvania Railroad and Snapp, “the State is only a nominal party 
without a real interest of its own,” id. at 600, and allowing standing 
would be tantamount to allowing the exact kind of suit that Mellon 
forbids. See id. at 602 (“A quasi-sovereign interest must be sufficiently 
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concrete to create an actual controversy between the State and the 
defendant.”).  
Thus, even against non-federal defendants, the Court in Snapp 
identified only two sets of circumstances in which states may in fact 
have a “quasi-sovereign” interest sufficient to confer standing: “First, a 
State has a quasi-sovereign interest in the health and well-being — 
both physical and economic — of its residents in general. Second, a 
State has a quasi-sovereign interest in not being discriminatorily 
denied its rightful status within the federal system.” Id. at 607.  
b. A State Does Not Have an Independent Interest in 
Seeking to Protect Its Citizens from the Operation of 
Federal Law 
 
Nothing in Snapp, or in any other Supreme Court decision before 
or since, suggests that states have a similar interest in protecting their 
citizens from federal law, especially in suits against federal defendants. 
After all, states cannot have an interest in protecting their citizens from 
the operation of valid federal laws, since those laws are “the supreme 
Law of the Land . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State 
to the Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also 
Mondou v. N.Y., New Haven, & Hartford R.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 57 (1912) 
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(“When Congress . . . adopted that act, it spoke for all the people and all 
the states, and thereby established a policy for all. That policy is as 
much the policy of [a state] as if the act had emanated from its own 
legislature, and should be respected accordingly in the courts of the 
state.”). 
It necessarily follows that, even if a quasi-sovereign interest could 
support standing in a suit against the federal government, a state 
cannot claim a quasi-sovereign interest in protecting its citizens from 
allegedly invalid federal laws. See, e.g., Georgia v. Pa. R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 
at 446–47 (explaining that quasi-sovereign interests do not extend to 
suits “where a State sought to protect her citizens from the operation of 
federal statutes”). A contrary conclusion would be patently 
irreconcilable with Mellon, Texas v. ICC, and the litany of additional 
cases in which the Supreme Court rejected the argument that states 
may sue the federal government on claims that the latter exceeded its 
constitutional authority in its regulation of individuals. 
c. States Cannot Create a Quasi-Sovereign Interest by 
Purporting to Exempt State Citizens from Federal Law 
 
Nor is the above analysis altered by the suggestion that a state 
might have a quasi-sovereign interest in defending the applicability of 
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state law as against an allegedly invalid federal law. To be sure, Snapp 
reiterated the state’s sovereign (not “quasi-sovereign”) interest in “the 
exercise of sovereign power over individuals and entities within the 
relevant jurisdiction,” which “involves the power to create and enforce a 
legal code, both civil and criminal.” 458 U.S. at 601. But that (by then 
well-established) interest goes only to a state’s power to ensure that its 
laws are followed by those who are bound to comply. See, e.g., 
Woolhandler & Collins, supra, at 422–23. The state’s interest in 
enforcing its legal code must necessarily give way to federal law 
whenever a conflict arises, all the more so because the existence of a 
conflict in no way bears upon the underlying constitutionality of the 
federal law. 
To that end, no part of the Court’s analysis in Snapp or any other 
case can fairly be read to suggest that a state could create a quasi-
sovereign interest simply by creating a conflict. “A state cannot by 
creating an agency for the purpose of making life better in the state 
obtain a legal interest in every transaction to which an entity within 
the state is a party.” Ill. Dep’t of Transp. v. Hinson, 122 F.3d 370, 373 
(7th Cir. 1997) (Posner, C.J.).  
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It is therefore bootstrapping to conclude that “‘Federal regulatory 
action that preempts state law creates a sufficient injury-in-fact to 
satisfy [Snapp].’” Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 607 (quoting Wyoming ex 
rel. Crank v. United States, 539 F.3d 1236, 1242 (10th Cir. 2008)). It is 
not the fact of preemption that might inflict a sufficiently concrete 
injury upon the state to confer standing, but the unique nature of the 
state interest with which the federal law arguably interferes.7 Absent 
some more specific quasi-sovereign, proprietary, or private interest 
arising out of the application of federal law, states may not sue the 
federal government simply to protect their citizens from allegedly 
unconstitutional laws. 
                                                 
7. This conclusion may help to explain the Supreme Court’s 
observation in Franchise Tax Board that “[t]here are good reasons why 
the federal courts should not entertain suits by the States to declare the 
validity of their regulations despite possibly conflicting federal law. 
States are not significantly prejudiced by an inability to come to federal 
court for a declaratory judgment in advance of a possible injunctive suit 
by a person subject to federal regulation.” Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. 
Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 21 (1983); see also Kevin C. 
Walsh, The Ghost That Slew the Mandate, 64 STAN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2011) (arguing that Franchise Tax Board precludes federal 
jurisdiction where, as here, states seek a declaratory judgment that 
state law is not preempted because the conflicting federal law is 
unconstitutional). 
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III. THE DISTRICT COURT’S HOLDING THAT VIRGINIA HAS STANDING 
WOULD HAVE GRAVE IMPLICATIONS FOR JUSTICIABILITY 
DOCTRINE 
 
a. The District Court Rested Virginia’s Standing Solely on 
the Conflict Between State and Federal Law 
 
As noted above, the district court concluded that Virginia has 
standing because of the conflict between the individual mandate and 
Virginia’s Health Care Freedom Act, VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3430.1:1, 
which provides that: 
No resident of this Commonwealth, regardless of 
whether he has or is eligible for health insurance coverage 
under any policy or program provided by or through his 
employer, or a plan sponsored by the Commonwealth or the 
federal government, shall be required to obtain or maintain 
a policy of individual insurance coverage except as required 
by a court or the Department of Social Services where an 
individual is named a party in a judicial or administrative 
proceeding. 
 
What should be clear from the text of the statute is that it is not a 
criminal provision of the Virginia code, nor is it a law that reflects 
Virginia’s quasi-sovereign interest in either “the health and well-being 
— both physical and economic — of its residents in general” or “in not 
being discriminatorily denied its rightful status within the federal 
system.” Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607. The law creates no penalties, nor does 
it impose any obligations on (or barriers to conduct by) private citizens, 
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who remain free “to privately contract for health insurance for family 
members or former family members.” Instead, the law exempts Virginia 
citizens from a requirement that, practically, could only be imposed by 
the federal government. Put simply, the statute serves no sovereign or 
quasi-sovereign interest other than to provoke a conflict with federal 
law. 
Nevertheless, the district court concluded that the existence of a 
conflict between the individual mandate and the Virginia Health Care 
Freedom Act is sufficient to confer standing upon Virginia. See Sebelius, 
702 F. Supp. 2d at 606–07. Invoking the Tenth Circuit’s “principled and 
logical reasoning” in Wyoming, see id. at 607, the court concluded that 
Virginia, through its Attorney General, satisfies the standing 
requirements of Article III. 
As the above analysis suggests, however, the mere fact of 
preemption is not — and cannot be — sufficient to create a sovereign or 
quasi-sovereign interest supporting Virginia’s standing to challenge the 
constitutionality of federal regulation. And although the district court 
heavily relied upon it, the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Wyoming is not to 
the contrary. As was true in Massachusetts v. EPA, Wyoming’s suit was 
Case: 11-1057     Document: 40-1      Date Filed: 03/07/2011      Page: 31
26 
 
specifically authorized by the APA. See 539 F.3d at 1242–44. The 
question presented to the Tenth Circuit was only whether the Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in 
interpreting a federal statute; like Massachusetts before it, Wyoming 
was asserting its statutory rights under federal law.8 
In that regard, it is telling that the district court in this case 
provided no additional analysis of, or explanation for, how the 
individual mandate affects Virginia’s sovereign interests as distinct 
from the interests of her citizens; its standing analysis rises and falls on 
the simple but incorrect conclusion that a claim of preemption will 
always suffice to confer upon the state an interest sufficient to 
challenge the constitutionality of the conflicting federal law. 
                                                 
8. To similar effect, the two circuit decisions on which the Wyoming 
court relied in holding that preemption is sufficient to confer standing 
also involved situations where states were suing federal agencies for 
failing to comply with federal statutes. See Alaska v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Transp., 868 F.2d 441, 444 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“Congress has expressly 
contemplated that States may be heard to complain of injury inflicted 
by the Orders.”); Ohio ex rel. Celebrezze v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 766 
F.2d 228, 233 (6th Cir. 1985) (“The threatened injury to a State’s 
enforcement of its safety laws is within the zone of interests of the 
Administrative Procedure Act and the Hazardous Materials 
Transportation Act.”). 
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b. Such Reasoning Would “Make a Mockery” of the Case-or-
Controversy Requirement 
 
Because the district court rested Virginia’s standing on the mere 
existence of a conflict between federal and state law, and identified no 
freestanding injury to any other quasi-sovereign or proprietary interest, 
its holding allows for no principled distinction between this suit and any 
other in which a state would use preemption as the basis for standing to 
bring a constitutional challenge to federal law. Nor is there any logical 
distinction between such a suit and one in which the state’s objection 
sounded purely in the applicability of a federal statute — not that the 
conflicting federal statute was unconstitutional, but merely that it did 
not actually preempt state law. Such overbroad and cursory analysis, if 
allowed to stand, would create three distinct problems for contemporary 
standing doctrine. 
First, allowing states to challenge the constitutionality of federal 
laws by creating a statutory conflict with state law would provide an 
all-too-effective end-run around Mellon, since it would reduce the 
Supreme Court’s bar on parens patriae suits against the federal 
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government to cases in which there is no positive state law with which 
the challenged federal action is in tension.9 
Second, to the extent that Mellon reflects deeper principles about 
Article III standing, including the bar on generalized grievances and 
the requirement that the plaintiff suffer a concrete, particularized 
injury, a rule that allows states to sue the federal government whenever 
there is a conflict between state and federal law would risk vitiating 
those requirements altogether in any instance in which a conflict is 
alleged to exist. Indeed, if a putative conflict between state and federal 
law itself sufficed to satisfy the injury-in-fact prong of standing 
analysis, see Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 607, there would be no way of 
ensuring that the challenged federal law actually injured an individual 
party; the existence of standing would be governed simply by the 
abstract — and quite possibly hypothetical — conflict between state and 
federal law. See, e.g., Bickel, supra, at 90 (“Time and again, precisely 
like a council of revision, the Court would be pronouncing the 
                                                 
9. Even this distinction might prove illusory; federal law in most 
relevant cases will displace at least some state law, such as state tort 
law in the case of federal law governing the manufacture of medical 
devices. See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).  
Case: 11-1057     Document: 40-1      Date Filed: 03/07/2011      Page: 34
29 
 
abstraction that some law generally like the one before it would or 
would not generally be constitutional in the generality of its 
applications.”).  
In addition to prematurely (and perhaps unnecessarily) involving 
the courts in a political dispute, such a result would also fly in the face 
of the Court’s repeated admonition that “we must carefully inquire as to 
whether [plaintiffs] have met their burden of establishing that their 
claimed injury is personal, particularized, concrete, and otherwise 
judicially cognizable.” Raines, 521 U.S. at 820.  
Third, and perhaps counterintuitively, “expansive state standing 
has a serious potential to undermine rather than complement 
individual standing in constitutional cases,” Woolhandler & Collins, 
supra, at 396; see also id. at 504 (“[I]ncreased state standing could 
potentially undermine individual standing to litigate individual and 
structural constitutional guaranties.”), both because it would prioritize 
claims by states over those of individuals and because of the likelihood 
that it would be “majority reinforcing,” placing into tension “[t]he 
freedom of government” and “the freedom from government.” See id. at 
483. In other words, a doctrine that allows states to sue in virtually any 
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instance of conflict with federal law would short-circuit the principal 
means through which majorities have traditionally exercised control 
over the scope of federal power — at the ballot box — and come at the 
expense of those parties who historically have been left to the courts to 
vindicate their rights.  
c. Preemption-Based Standing Would Also Incentive State 
Attempts to Impermissibly Nullify Federal Laws 
 
Finally, it bears noting that Virginia’s Health Care Freedom Act is 
hardly the first — or most aggressive — recent attempt by a state to 
manufacture a conflict with federal law. Idaho’s Health Freedom Act 
goes even further, providing that 
The power to require or regulate a person’s choice in 
the mode of securing health care services, or to impose a 
penalty related thereto, is not found in the Constitution of 
the United States of America, and is therefore a power 
reserved to the people pursuant to the Ninth Amendment, 
and to the several states pursuant to the Tenth Amendment. 
The state of Idaho hereby exercises its sovereign power to 
declare the public policy of the state of Idaho regarding the 
right of all persons residing in the state of Idaho in choosing 
the mode of securing health care services free from the 
imposition of penalties, or the threat thereof, by the federal 
government of the United States of America relating thereto. 
 
IDAHO CODE § 39-9003(1) (2010); see also THOMAS E. WOODS, JR., 
NULLIFICATION: HOW TO RESIST FEDERAL TYRANNY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
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122–23 (2010) (quoting the Idaho law and invoking it as a model for 
future state efforts to nullify allegedly unconstitutional federal laws).  
In one sense, these efforts may reflect “the political reality that a 
smaller unit of government is more likely to have a population with 
preferences that depart from the majority’s. It is, therefore, more likely 
to try an approach that could not command a national majority.” 
Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1498 (1987) (book review). But that only 
further undermines the argument that such conflicts should create 
standing, for it would inevitably lead to multifarious efforts to challenge 
federal legislation from every direction, and by every constituency.10 As 
Professor Bickel warned, “It would make a mockery . . . of the 
constitutional requirement of case or controversy . . . to countenance 
automatic litigation — and automatic it would surely become — by 
                                                 
10. In February 2011, for example, the Arizona Senate passed S.B. 
1178 (the “Intrastate Commerce Act”), which provides that all services 
performed within Arizona, and all goods grown or made in the state for 
consumption within the state, “are not subject to the authority of 
Congress under its constitutional power to regulate commerce among 
the several states.” The bill also imposes substantial fines for state or 
federal officers who attempt to enforce federal laws that are 
inconsistent with those proscriptions. 
Case: 11-1057     Document: 40-1      Date Filed: 03/07/2011      Page: 37
32 
 
states situated no differently” than Virginia is here. Bickel, supra, at 
89–90. 
Virginia’s Health Care Freedom Act does not expressly “nullify” 
federal law. But it was enacted to invite the same result, albeit via 
judicial invalidation rather than outright nullification. To allow 
standing based solely on the existence of such statutes is to take up 
such an invitation, and to involve the courts in an enterprise that 
Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement was specifically intended 
(and has long been interpreted) to keep them out of. 
*                          *                          * 
 
Ultimately, whether or not the individual mandate is a 
constitutional exercise of Congress’s Article I powers is an important 
question, but one that does not turn in any meaningful way on state 
laws purporting to exempt state citizens from its operation. If the 
individual mandate is constitutional, then these state laws will all fall 
under the Supremacy Clause. If the individual mandate is not 
constitutional, then it will fall regardless of whether it conflicts with 
any state laws. Even at its broadest, standing doctrine has never 
encompassed such an undifferentiated, unspecific, and ultimately 
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irrelevant injury to state law. To allow such a suit to proceed here 
would be to sanction a practice that the text, purpose, and history of the 
Constitution expressly forbid, and  
would be a fundamental denial of perhaps the most 
innovating principle of the Constitution: the principle that 
the federal government is a sovereign coexisting in the same 
territory with the states and acting, not through them, like 
some international organization, but directly upon the 
citizenry, which is its own as well as theirs. 
 
Bickel, supra, at 89. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, amici curiae respectfully submit that 
the district court’s decision be vacated and remanded with instructions 
to dismiss for lack of standing. 
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